## AT: DSCA DA

### 2AC – Aid Fails

#### Military aid fails – won’t deter Russia or affect the outcome of the war – only diplomatic compromises solve the conflict.

Boston and Charap ’22 (Scott Boston, senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, received a master’s degree in International Relations from Yale and a bachelor’s degree in military history from West Point. Samuel Charap, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, holds a Ph.D. in political science and an M.Phil. in Russian and East European studies from the University of Oxford, where he was a Marshall Scholar, received a B.A. in Russian and political science from Amherst College, is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, served at the U.S. Department of State as senior advisor to the undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff. “U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine: A Silver Bullet?” 01/21/22 <https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/01/us-military-aid-to-ukraine-a-silver-bullet.html>) ☺

The justification for the aid has varied. Some have made the [case](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-to-deal-with-the-kremlin-created-crisis-in-europe/) that U.S. military assistance to Ukraine can change Russia's calculus now, possibly deterring Moscow from launching an attack. Others claim that aid to the Ukrainian military can have a real impact on a possible fight with the Russians, making it meaningfully more challenging for the Kremlin to achieve victory and ruling out certain military options Russia might be considering. And there are also voices who call for additional capabilities merely to raise costs for Moscow—that is, to kill more Russian soldiers—so as to create political problems for President Vladimir Putin at home, although without much expectation that Ukraine would prevail.

None of these arguments is convincing. That does not mean security cooperation with Kyiv should cease. It does mean that military assistance is not an effective lever for resolving this crisis.

Since 2014, the United States has [provided](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/01/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/) over $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine, following the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbass. U.S. assistance to Ukraine has included the provision of trainers, selected defensive systems (such as counter-mortar radars), and more recently, Javelin anti-tank missiles. This assistance has principally aimed to improve Ukrainian effectiveness in the relatively static conflict against Russian-backed separatist forces in the Donbass, who are mainly armed with small arms and light weapons, along with some artillery and Soviet-era armor.

Crucially, however, Ukraine has mainly not been fighting Russia's armed forces in the Donbass. Yes, Russia has armed, trained, and led the separatist forces. But even by Kyiv's own [estimates](https://ru.slovoidilo.ua/2021/11/12/novost/obshhestvo/vsu-nazvali-kolichestvo-voennyx-rf-okkupirovannoj-chasti-donbassa), the vast majority of rebel forces consist of locals—not soldiers of the regular Russian military. Indeed, the Russian armed forces engaged directly in the fighting only twice—in [August–September 2014](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49426724) and [January–February 2015](https://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/looking-back-at-the-battle-of-debaltseve/)—and with limited capabilities, although both episodes ended in crushing Ukrainian defeats.

Moscow has sought to retain some veil of deniability about its involvement in the conflict, which meant the Russian military never used more than a tiny fraction of its capabilities against the Ukrainians. It applied just enough force to get the job done while avoiding protracted, overt interventions. A wide variety of signature Russian capabilities—including its air force and ballistic and cruise missiles—have not been involved in the fighting at all, even as they have been repeatedly demonstrated in combat operations in Syria.

The nature of the [reported](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-ukraine-invasion/2021/12/03/98a3760e-546b-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html) Russian buildup suggests the expanded war, if it happens, will differ fundamentally from the past seven years of simmering stalemate. Russia has the ability to carry out a [large-scale joint offensive operation](https://www.foi.se/en/foi/reports/report-summary.html?reportNo=FOI-R--4758--SE) involving tens of thousands of personnel, thousands of armored vehicles, and hundreds of combat aircraft. It would likely begin with devastating air and missile strikes from land, air, and naval forces, striking deep into Ukraine to attack headquarters, airfields, and logistics points. Ukrainian forces would begin the conflict [nearly surrounded](https://rochan-consulting.com/the-map-the-ukrainian-military-intelligence/) from the very start, with Russian forces arrayed along the eastern border, naval and amphibious forces threatening from the Black Sea in the south, and the potential (increasingly real) for additional Russian forces to [deploy into Belarus](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-belarus-plan-joint-military-drills-february-lukashenko-2022-01-17/) and threaten from the north, where the border is less than 65 miles from Kyiv itself.

In short, this war will look nothing like the status quo ante of conflict in Ukraine, and that undermines the first justification for U.S. aid: deterring Russia. The Ukrainian military has been shaped to fight the conflict in the Donbass and thus poses little deterrent threat to Russia; provision of U.S. weapons can do nothing to change that. If Moscow is willing to launch a major war, invading the second-largest country in Europe with a population of over 40 million, all while absorbing tremendous economic punishment from the West, then it is unlikely to be deterred by whatever U.S. military assistance can be delivered in the coming weeks. The only weapons systems that could plausibly impose costs that could change Russia's calculus, such as surface-to-air missiles and combat aircraft, are ones that the United States would be highly unlikely to provide the Ukrainians. And, regardless, they could not be procured, delivered, and be made operational—to say nothing of getting the Ukrainian operators trained up to use them—in time to have an impact on this crisis. Large, modern systems require extensive training and material support.

Once deterrence fails and a war begins, the Ukrainian armed forces will find themselves in desperate circumstances almost immediately. Ukraine does not have anywhere near enough forces to credibly defend against all the potential avenues of attack, which means it would have to choose between defending a select set of fixed strong points—ceding control of other areas—or maneuvering to engage Russian forces that outnumber them. The line of conflict in the Donbass will be but one of many fronts. The Ukrainian fortifications there may well look like a modern-day Maginot Line: prepared for a frontal attack that may never come and bypassed by the mobile forces of an adversary with more-advanced aircraft and more-mobile land forces.

Ukraine's great size means that the land forces operating there will be required to move to cover large areas of rural terrain. Mobile engagements would benefit Russian forces, which are far better trained and equipped to conduct coordinated air and land maneuver warfare than their Ukrainian opponents. The Russian military has repeatedly practiced the use of long-range strike and [tactical fires cued by drones](http://www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/blog/2018/5/30/the-russian-reconnaissance-fire-complex-comes-of-age) as well as other means of reconnaissance, both in training and in combat operations in Syria. Russia's combat aircraft and strategic air defenses give Moscow many more options to control the air and to strike Ukrainian forces, and most Russian pilots have recent real-world experience in Syria. The Ukrainian military also largely operates legacy Soviet weapons; Russian forces have a deep familiarity with the limitations of these systems and know what tactics to employ to further reduce their effectiveness.

In short, the military balance between Russia and Ukraine is so lopsided in Moscow's favor that any assistance Washington might provide in coming weeks would be largely irrelevant in determining the outcome of a conflict should it begin. Russia's advantages in capacity, capability, and geography combine to pose insurmountable challenges for Ukrainian forces tasked with defending their country. The second argument for aid—changing the course of the war—thus does not hold water.

The third argument for aid is to provide assistance to enable a Ukrainian insurgency to impose costs on a Russian occupying force. Many have in mind the historical analogy here of U.S. aid to the mujahideen in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion in 1979. Indeed, some are even recommending providing the same Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles that plagued the Soviet air force at the time.

If Russia attempts a long-term occupation of areas with lots of hostile Ukrainians, these forms of support could, on the margins, complicate matters for Moscow. But U.S. support to a Ukrainian insurgency should be a matter of last resort during an extended conflict, not a centerpiece of policy before it has even started. The prospect of a marginally more costly occupation is unlikely to make a difference to Moscow if it gets to that stage; it will have already absorbed far more significant costs. Russian planners are aware that a lot can go wrong in a large-scale operation, especially an occupation. If Putin takes the decision to occupy large parts of Ukraine, it will not be because he believes it will be easy or inexpensive to Russia.

We should also keep in mind that the costs of a war that lasts to the point of an insurgency campaign in Ukraine will be disproportionately borne by Ukrainians. At that stage of conflict, thousands—or, more likely, tens of thousands—of Ukrainians will have died. For any successes they achieve against the Russian occupiers, Ukrainian insurgents will be made to pay dearly; the experience of the Syrian opposition or the Chechen insurgents is not one Americans should wish on a close partner like Ukraine.

In normal times, there are many good reasons for the United States to provide military support to Ukraine. But these are not normal times. Military assistance now will at best be marginal in affecting the outcome of the crisis. It might be morally justified to help a U.S. partner at risk of aggression. But given the scale of the potential threat to Ukraine and its forces, the most effective way Washington can help is to work on finding a diplomatic solution.

### 2AC – Aid Bad – War

#### Military aid to Ukraine escalates conflict and backs Putin into a corner – only political settlement avoids nuclear war.

Hirsh ’22 (Michael Hirsh, senior correspondent at Foreign Policy, co-winner of the Overseas Press Club award for best magazine reporting from abroad in 2001 for "prescience in identifying the al Qaeda threat half a year before the September 11 attacks" and for his coverage of the global war on terrorism, which also won two National Magazine Awards for General Excellence. “Biden’s Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame” 04/29/22 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-war-biden-endgame/>) ☺

In a dramatic series of shifts this week, U.S. President Joe Biden and his NATO allies have escalated their policy of helping to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression into a policy of undermining the power and influence of Russia itself. In so doing, some observers fear, they are leaving Russian President Vladimir Putin little choice but to surrender or double down militarily, raising the possibility of widening his war beyond Ukraine.

On Thursday, Biden urged Congress to provide $33 billion in additional military, economic, and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine—more than double the previous amount—and said he was sending a clear message to Putin: “You will never succeed in dominating Ukraine.” Beyond that, Biden said in remarks at the White House, the new policy was intended “to punish Russian aggression, to lessen the risk of future conflicts.”

That followed an equally clear declaration this week from U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who after a meeting in Kyiv with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the U.S. objective is now to curtail Russia’s power over the long term so it does not have the “capability to reproduce” its military assault on Ukraine. “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” Austin said in a stopover in Poland.

The shift may have been what prompted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to declare afterward that Washington and the West had entered a “proxy” war with Russia, risking another world war that, Lavrov warned, could go nuclear. “The danger is serious, real. And we must not underestimate it,” Lavrov said. Putin also again suggested this week, as he has since the beginning of his invasion on Feb. 24, that he still had the option of using nuclear weapons against NATO, saying, “We have all the instruments for this [to respond to a direct threat to Russia]—ones nobody else can boast of. And we will use them, if we have to.”

The newly aggressive U.S. approach won plaudits from many quarters—in particular from current and former NATO officials who insist the Russian nuclear counterthreats are only empty rhetoric.

“It’s the only way to go forward,” said former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in an interview. “In Putin’s thinking it doesn’t make any difference, because he would only claim that the Western policy is to weaken Russia anyway. So why not speak openly about it? The mistake we made in the past was to underestimate the ambitions of Vladimir Putin, to underestimate his brutality. At the same time, we overestimated the strength of the Russian military.”

The new U.S. and NATO strategy is partly based on Ukraine’s continuing battlefield success against Putin, who has been forced to scale down his ambitions from a full takeover of Ukraine to a major new assault in its eastern and southern parts. NATO allies including Germany, which until this week had equivocated on sending heavy offensive weaponry to Ukraine, have ratcheted up their aid in response. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, under political pressure at home and abroad, announced earlier this week that his country would provide 50 anti-aircraft tanks to Ukraine.

Yet other Russia experts expressed worry that the United States and its Western allies are, in effect, crossing the very redlines they have avoided until now. For most of the two-month conflict, Biden has refused to authorize any military support, such as major offensive weapons or a no-fly zone, that might be perceived as putting U.S. or NATO forces in direct conflict with Russia. Now, some observers worry that with the additional aid and tougher economic sanctions, the U.S. president is forcing Putin into a corner in which he can only fight on or surrender. The latter course would mean relinquishing Putin’s career-long aim of strengthening Russia against the West. Yet Putin, who has long said the West’s goal was to weaken or contain Russia, has never been known to surrender during his decade and a half of aggressive moves against neighboring countries, mainly Ukraine and Georgia.

“In the Kremlin’s eyes the West is out to get Russia. It was unspoken before. Now it’s spoken,” said Sean Monaghan, an expert on Europe at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “If you combine this with Biden’s comments, at his summit in Poland last month, that ‘this man [Putin] cannot remain in power,’ all that turns this a territorial war into a wider confrontation and might make negotiating a settlement to end the war in Ukraine far more difficult or even impossible at the present.” (Biden officials later said that the president was not seeking regime change in Russia.)

George Beebe, a former chief of Russia analysis for the CIA, said that the Biden administration may be in danger of forgetting that the “the most important national interest that the United States has is avoiding a nuclear conflict with Russia.” He added that “the Russians have the ability to make sure everyone else loses if they lose too. And that may be where we’re heading. It’s a dangerous corner to turn.”

Perhaps the most worrisome turn of events is that there no longer appears to be any possibility of a negotiated way out of the war—despite Putin’s statement to visiting United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres that he still hopes for such a solution.

“It’s one thing to pursue a policy of weakening Putin, quite another to say it out loud. We have to find a way for Putin to achieve a political solution, so perhaps it is not wise to state this,” said one senior European diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“It’s getting more dangerous,” said Charles Kupchan, a former senior U.S. official and now a scholar of international relations at Georgetown University. “We need to start moving beyond Javelins and anti-tank missiles and talk about a political endgame.” Or, as Beebe put it, “We need to find a way of somehow discreetly conveying to the Russians that we would be willing to ease sanctions in the context of an international settlement.

#### Ukrainian arms sales are the biggest lapses in oversight in recent history- that independently causes escalation.

Desiderio et al ’22 [Andrew; 2 June; Studied journalism @ GW; POLITICO, “Pentagon vs. Congress tension builds over monitoring billions in Ukraine aid,” <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/02/congress-pentagon-ukraine-aid-oversight-00036463>]

The Pentagon was already struggling to keep up with Congress’ demands for oversight of its spending. Then, lawmakers earmarked an extra $40 billion for Ukraine.

Concerns are mounting on Capitol Hill about the Biden administration’s ability to properly account for the unprecedented wave of cash and to track the thousands of U.S. weapons heading to Ukraine for its war with Russia. And given the Pentagon’s recent track record concerning congressional oversight, it’s coming under increased scrutiny from members of both parties — from progressive Elizabeth Warren to libertarian Rand Paul.

Some lawmakers are already warning the Biden administration that a future aid package could lose the overwhelming congressional support that has been a hallmark of the previous efforts. A key barometer will be the Pentagon’s handling and complete accounting of the funds, which has lagged in other areas, sparking scrutiny from congressional committees.

Sen. Warren (D-Mass.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, said in an email that a full accounting of the already-appropriated funding will be “critically important for both past and future funding requests.”

“The U.S. government is sending billions in humanitarian, economic, and military assistance to help the Ukrainian people overcome Putin’s brutal war, and the American people expect strong oversight by Congress and full accounting from the Department of Defense,” she added.

Pentagon spokesperson Marine Corps Lt. Col. Anton Semelroth said the department is “committed” to transparency with the public and with Congress about the security assistance funds. But he stressed that war involves risk, and called on Russia to end the conflict.

“Risk of diversion is one of many considerations that we routinely assess when evaluating any potential arms transfer,” Semelroth said. “In this case, risk would be considerably minimized by the full withdrawal from Ukraine by Russian forces.”

While all Democrats and most Republicans voted for the aid package in May, it’s unclear whether that coalition can stick together if President Joe Biden asks Congress for more money before the end of the fiscal year, as many on the Hill predict will be the case. The Pentagon already owes Congress a backlog of reports on its spending for European security, and progressives and conservatives alike have said they’ll be looking for more cooperation before approving another cash infusion.

Amid the Pentagon-Hill squabbling, Biden announced on Wednesday the first tranche of military assistance from the massive funding bill that cleared both chambers last month. And oversight concerns are at the forefront, as the newly announced $700 million package for the first time includes a more advanced, precision-guided rocket system that will allow Ukraine to strike targets even further away — potentially in Russia.

The Biden administration deliberated for weeks over whether to send the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, known as HIMARS, and medium or long-range munitions. Officials worried that providing longer-range rockets could provoke Russian President Vladimir Putin into escalating the conflict. They ultimately decided to send the shorter-range rockets, which can reach 48 miles, instead of the longer-range munitions, which can fly 190 miles.

Officials worry about the department’s ability to keep track of all the weapons the U.S. is providing, including the HIMARS, as well as ensuring they are being used effectively. Kyiv has given Washington “assurances” that it will only use the rockets on the battlefield in Ukraine, and not to strike targets in Russia, senior administration officials said. But they did not detail those assurances, and there is concern that the Pentagon has no way to monitor the use of the weapons.

#### **US arms sales have locked in Russian aggression and drawn us in- it’s only a question of if they win or use nukes.**

Hirsh ’22 [Michael; 29 Apr; co-winner of the Overseas Press Club award for best magazine reporting from abroad in 2001 for "prescience in identifying the al Qaeda threat half a year before the September 11 attacks" and for Newsweek's coverage of the global war on terrorism, which also won two National Magazine Awards for General Excellence; Foreign Policy, “Biden’s Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-war-biden-endgame/]

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That followed an equally clear declaration this week from U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who after a meeting in Kyiv with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the U.S. objective is now to curtail Russia’s power over the long term so it does not have the “capability to reproduce” its military assault on Ukraine. “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” Austin said in a stopover in Poland.

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The newly aggressive U.S. approach won plaudits from many quarters—in particular from current and former NATO officials who insist the Russian nuclear counterthreats are only empty rhetoric.

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The new U.S. and NATO strategy is partly based on Ukraine’s continuing battlefield success against Putin, who has been forced to scale down his ambitions from a full takeover of Ukraine to a major new assault in its eastern and southern parts. NATO allies including Germany, which until this week had equivocated on sending heavy offensive weaponry to Ukraine, have ratcheted up their aid in response. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, under political pressure at home and abroad, announced earlier this week that his country would provide 50 anti-aircraft tanks to Ukraine.

Yet other Russia experts expressed worry that the United States and its Western allies are, in effect, crossing the very redlines they have avoided until now. For most of the two-month conflict, Biden has refused to authorize any military support, such as major offensive weapons or a no-fly zone, that might be perceived as putting U.S. or NATO forces in direct conflict with Russia. Now, some observers worry that with the additional aid and tougher economic sanctions, the U.S. president is forcing Putin into a corner in which he can only fight on or surrender. The latter course would mean relinquishing Putin’s career-long aim of strengthening Russia against the West. Yet Putin, who has long said the West’s goal was to weaken or contain Russia, has never been known to surrender during his decade and a half of aggressive moves against neighboring countries, mainly Ukraine and Georgia.

“In the Kremlin’s eyes the West is out to get Russia. It was unspoken before. Now it’s spoken,” said Sean Monaghan, an expert on Europe at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “If you combine this with Biden’s comments, at his summit in Poland last month, that ‘this man [Putin] cannot remain in power,’ all that turns this a territorial war into a wider confrontation and might make negotiating a settlement to end the war in Ukraine far more difficult or even impossible at the present.” (Biden officials later said that the president was not seeking regime change in Russia.)

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Yet any such negotiation looks less likely than ever. Both sides appear to be settling in for a long fight. After meeting with Putin and Lavrov on Tuesday, Guterres acknowledged that an imminent cease-fire was not in the cards and that the war “will not end with meetings.”

Only a month ago Zelensky was floating the idea of a neutral Ukraine that did not join NATO, and he suggested that separatist forces in eastern Ukraine should be acknowledged. But Zelensky has since told European Council President Charles Michel that, in light of Russian atrocities, Ukrainian public opinion was against negotiations and favored continuing the war.

Meanwhile, Finland and Sweden have indicated they are interested in joining the NATO alliance, breaking with their longtime policy of nonalignment and potentially creating a new hair-trigger environment along Russia’s northern border. That would deliver a devastating blow to Putin, who has often cited NATO’s eastward expansion as a casus belli for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

And there is little prospect that any of these tensions will abate anytime soon. Austin also convened a 40-nation “Ukraine Contact Group” this week that was readying itself for what Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley has said is likely a “protracted conflict” that will be “at least measured in years.”

Biden has not said what the U.S. response might be if Putin deploys tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, neither side has set any clear rules in the post-Cold War environment for the deployment of nuclear weapons—especially as Cold War-era arms agreements such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty have been shelved and nuclear weapon delivery systems have become faster and more governed by automatic digitized systems. Under a Kremlin policy known as “escalating to de-escalate”—threatening to go nuclear if the West tries to stop him—Putin has year by year reintroduced nuclear weapons into his conventional war calculations. During his two decades in power, he has authorized the construction of nuclear-powered cruise missiles, transoceanic nuclear-armed torpedoes, hypersonic glide vehicles, and more low-yield nuclear weapons on the European continent.

### 1AR – Aid Bad – War

#### Russia sees US weapons deliveries as a threat – escalates the conflict and diminishes possibility of a peace settlement.

Faulconbridge ’22 (Guy Faulconbridge, reporter for Reuters. “Russia warns United States against sending more arms to Ukraine” 04/25/22 <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-warned-united-states-against-sending-more-arms-ukraine-2022-04-25/>) ☺

Russia told the United States to stop sending more arms to Ukraine, warning that large Western deliveries of weapons were inflaming the conflict and would lead to more losses, Moscow's ambassador to Washington said.

Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine has killed thousands of people, displaced millions more and raised fears of a wider confrontation between Russia and the United States - by far the world's two biggest nuclear powers.

The United States has ruled out sending its own or NATO forces to Ukraine but Washington and its European allies have supplied weapons to Kyiv such as drones, Howitzer heavy artillery, anti-aircraft Stinger and anti-tank Javelin missiles.

Anatoly Antonov, Russia's ambassador to the United States, said such arms deliveries were aimed at weakening Russia but that they were escalating the conflict in Ukraine while undermining efforts to reach some sort of peace agreement.

"What the Americans are doing is pouring oil on the flames," Antonov told the Rossiya 24 TV channel. "I see only an attempt to raise the stakes, to aggravate the situation, to see more losses."

### 2AC – No Impact – DIB

#### More like Dead Industrial Base

Halcrow and Jones ’22 [Stephanie and Nicholas; 9 June; Senior Fellow for Defense Industrial Base Health & Resiliency; National Defense, “Some Prescriptions for Ailing Defense Industrial Base,” https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/9/some-prescriptions-for-ailing-defense-industrial-base]

Earlier this year, the National Defense Industrial Association released Vital Signs 2022: The Health and Readiness of the Defense Industrial Base, the third edition of the flagship study. For the first time, the report scored the health of the industrial base business environment below a passing level.

The score does not reflect upon individual companies. Vital Signs measures the defense industry’s health through eight conditions that describe the defense business environment over the past year: demand, production inputs, innovation, supply chain, competition, industrial security, political and regulatory environment and productive capacity; and surge readiness.

These vital signs are an attempt to move beyond traditional defense industry analysis, which heavily relies upon the financial performances of a few companies, ignores key indicators and excludes the vast majority of defense contractors that are not publicly traded.

Unlike traditional medical vital signs measured on the spot, our conditions are observed remotely, both in time and space, using publicly available data and results from an annual survey. We believe this information reflects the state of the defense industrial base during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Based on the findings, we offer the following policy prescriptions.

First, as the Russian-Ukrainian War continues, Ukraine will need to be resupplied and U.S. stocks will need to be replenished. In the first year of the pandemic, the “productive capacity and surge readiness” vital sign demonstrated last year’s largest decline, largely due to weakness in the overall economy. In the 2022 survey, 78 percent of respondents said the availability of skilled labor was a moderate or significant problem.

### 2AC – No Tradeoff – Aid Inevitable

#### Uniqueness overwhelms the link – Congress gives money to Ukraine with no questions asked – conflict over other programs can’t derail spending.

Cochrane and Edmondson ’22 (Emily Cochran, reporter in the Washington bureau of the New York times, University of Florida graduate. Catie Edmondson, reporter in the Washington bureau of The New York Times. “House Passes $40 Billion More in Ukraine Aid, With Few Questions Asked“ 05/10/22 <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/us/politics/congress-ukraine-aid-questions.html>) ☺

The escalating brutality of the war in Ukraine has dampened voices on both the right and left skeptical of the United States’ involving itself in armed conflict overseas, fueling a rush by Congress to pour huge amounts of money into a potentially lengthy and costly offensive against Russia with few questions or reservations raised.

Under pressure to present a united front as President Vladimir V. Putin’s forces carry out a campaign of atrocities across Ukraine, lawmakers in both political parties who have previously railed against skyrocketing military budgets and entanglements in intractable conflicts abroad have gone largely silent about what is fast becoming a major military effort drawing on American resources.

The House on Tuesday night passed a $40 billion military and humanitarian aid package for Ukraine in an overwhelming 368 to 57 vote, weeks after lawmakers overwhelmingly approved $13.6 billion in emergency aid for the war effort. That total — roughly $53 billion over two months — goes beyond what President Biden requested and is poised to amount to the largest foreign aid package to move through Congress in at least two decades.

It also comes at a time when the two parties have been unable to reach agreement to invest in domestic programs. They include the [extension of a tax credit](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/02/business/economy/child-tax-credit.html) that pulled millions of American children out of poverty and even [a pandemic response package](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/us/politics/biden-pandemic-response-funding.html) to control the spread of the coronavirus, as Republicans and some Democrats raise concerns that such spending could exacerbate inflation and increase the federal deficit.

But stunned by the grisly images from Ukraine and leery of turning their backs on a country whose suffering has been on vivid display for the world, many lawmakers have put aside their skepticism and quietly agreed to the sprawling tranches of aid, keeping to themselves their concerns about the war and questions about the Biden administration’s strategy for American involvement.

And as Mr. Biden’s requests to Congress for money to fund the war effort have spiraled upward, leaders in both parties have largely refrained from questioning them. Instead, the packages have swelled to accommodate the two parties’ competing priorities, with Republicans adding money for military assistance and Democrats insisting that be matched by an equal addition for humanitarian aid.

They have been backed by pleas of urgency from both Ukrainian leaders and the Biden administration, which warned Congress this week that more aid would be needed before May 19 to continue providing military support.

On Tuesday, hours before the House was to vote, Oksana Markarova, the Ukrainian ambassador to the United States, met separately with Republicans and Democrats in the Senate, where the measure is now headed, to personally call for swift passage of the package.

“Her people are dying. They’re running out of supplies and ammunition. They need our help quickly,” said Senator Richard J. Durbin of Illinois, the No. 2 Democrat, describing Ms. Markarova’s message as: “Thank you for all our help, but please speed it up.”

The result has been that, at least for now, Congress is quickly and nearly unanimously embracing historic tranches of foreign aid with little public debate about the Biden administration’s strategy, whether the volume of military assistance could escalate the conflict, or whether domestic priorities are being pushed aside to accommodate the huge expenditures overseas.

“Time is of the essence — and we cannot afford to wait,” Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California wrote to lawmakers in a letter on Tuesday ahead of the vote. “With this aid package, America sends a resounding message to the world of our unwavering determination to stand with the courageous people of Ukraine until victory is won.”

### 1AR – No Tradeoff – Aid Inevitable

#### Opposition to bills is all political – congress doesn’t care about spending, so it won’t care if the plan and Ukraine funding explode budgets.

Gleckman ’22 (Howard Gleckman, senior fellow at The Urban Institute, reporter at Forbes. “Why Congress Will Borrow To Help Ukraine But May Offset New COVID-19 Medical Costs With Spending Cuts” 05/17/22 <https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2022/05/17/why-congress-will-borrow-to-help-ukraine-but-may-offset-new-covid-19-medical-costs-with-spending-cuts/?sh=605b7a965ff1>) ☺

Why is Congress prepared to spend billions of dollars for new aid to Ukraine without requiring offsetting tax increases or spending cuts at the same time lawmakers are demanding that more COVID-19-related therapeutics and testing be fully paid for?

It can’t be about the money. The next round of Ukraine aid will cost about $40 billion, even more than President Biden requested. By contrast, it looks like Congress is considering only about $10 billion, or one-quarter as much, for the COVID-19 health bill. If you are worried about the budget deficit, why fret about a $10 billion bill and ignore $40 billion in new spending?

It can’t be the seriousness of the problem, either.

Blocking Russian aggression in Ukraine certainly has critical geopolitical value. But the pandemic has [killed about 1 million Americans](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases-deaths-testing-trends), and more than [6 million worldwide](https://covid19.who.int/). And future waves of the virus are almost certain. Just last week, the White House warned of 100 million more US infections in the fall and winter without more vaccines, therapeutics, and testing.

It seems a stretch to argue that support for Ukraine is more important than treatments for COVID-19. So why is one spending initiative likely to be paid for with borrowed money and the other is mired in arguments about how to pay for it?

Politics

Well, politics of course.

Congress (really, the Senate) has spent weeks fiddling over the Ukraine money. But, in reality, there is broad bipartisan support for that assistance. Democrats overwhelmingly back it. And so do most Republicans.

[To help make the point](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/15/mcconnell-maga-ukraine-visit-00032572), Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell and others in the GOP leadership made a high-profile trip to Kiev over the weekend to express their support for the beleaguered country.

Only a handful of isolationist Republicans opposed the aid measure. One, Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), single-handedly delayed the bill for days. But the urgently needed money will pass relatively quickly, at least as measured in Senate-time.

That brings us to those payfors.

Losing focus

Because Congress rarely can agree on how to pay for anything it does, the Ukraine bill would become hopelessly stalled if it included offsetting tax increases or spending cuts. The merits of Ukraine funding would be long forgotten while lawmakers squabbled over how to pay for it. Odds are, they’d still be arguing well after Vladimir Putin’s victory parade.

And that, of course, is exactly what happened to the COVID-19 funding bill. Republicans, who opposed the merits of the COVID-19 bill for a long, complicated list of reasons, successfully stalled the measure simply by demanding that it be paid for.

That shifted the debate from the need for drugs and testing to those offsets. Add to that the growing public view that the pandemic is behind us, and Congress lost the all-important sense of urgency it needs to do anything these days.

Multiple roadblocks

Republicans have thrown several roadblocks in the way of the new COVID-19 money. First was their demand that it be funded with unspent pandemic relief dollars that initially were earmarked for state and local governments. Then, they shifted gears and insisted the bill also bar Biden from lifting a public health restriction on migrants crossing the US border with Mexico.

Biden initially hoped to get the money added to a huge government spending bill passed in March. But the argument over how to pay for it sidetracked that effort.

Biden then tried to link it to the less controversial Ukraine aid. But now, given the political realities and the urgent need to get weapons and assistance to Ukraine, Biden has agreed to split the bills. That likely will doom the pandemic funding for many more months. And if many public health experts are to be believed, it may result in more sickness and perhaps more death.

The deficit cudgel

The real story, of course, is that the vast majority of politicians in either party do not care about the deficit. When they demand that new spending be paid for, they really are saying they don’t want to spend the money at all. That was the message Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) sent to his fellow Democrats when he blocked Biden’s Build Back Better social spending and climate bill last year. And it appears to be the message Republicans are sending with the pandemic funding.

Lawmakers may appear to be fiscal hypocrites. But, really, their disinterest in the deficit is remarkably consistent. They just are using their alleged deficit concerns as a cudgel to kill bills they don’t like.